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This article develops an earlier analysis1 of definitions
and disqualifications of victimhood during armed con-
flict, claims of responsibility and apologies for harm,
based on the Northern Ireland case. The significance of
political structures is considered by considering the con-
sociational nature of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday
Agreement, which established two parallel political
dynasties, allowing the parties to the Northern Ireland
conflict to ‘agree to disagree’. The nature of this agree-
ment makes a ‘reconciliation’ between the parties optio-
nal and therefore unlikely without some intervention to
address the grievances of the past, proposals for which
were the responsibility of the Committee on Managing
the Past whose report caused controversy.
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THE DISTRIBUTION OF SUFFERING
n Northern Ireland, as elsewhere, the harm caused by poli-
tical violence is not evenly distributed.2 Of those killed by
political violence in Northern Ireland, 53% were civilians;
16% were members of the British Army; 15% were members of local
security forces; 10% were Republican paramilitaries; and 3% were
Loyalist paramilitaries.3 Deaths during the conflict were overwhel-
mingly male (91.1%) and disproportionately Catholic (43%), with
30% of the total killed Protestant and 18% of those killed from out-
side Northern Ireland, these latter mostly British soldiers.4
According to official figures 40,0005 were injured, and the scale of
permanent physical or emotional disability is unknown, although
studies have suggested that in some areas, a substantial share of the
population is adversely affected. These effects are also spatially con-
centrated. Whilst the conflict-related death rate for Northern
Ireland as a whole is 2.2 deaths per thousand of the population, the
small community of Ardoyne in North Belfast, for example, has a
death rate that is five times that figure.6 Some such communities
have experienced many multiple bereavements, and often these
communities, blighted by violence, also experience high levels of
socio-economic deprivation.7
DIVERSE PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENCE
For some, such as those who have sustained personal loss or perso-
nal injury, or for those who have experienced the effects of the
militarization of their community, violence has structured their
relationships to the state, to authority, to their families, to others
in the community and wider society. It has, in some cases, altered
their relationship to themselves and it continues to shape they way
they imagine the future.
I
2 For an account of the distribution of casualties during the Iraq war, see
ROBERTS, L. [et al.]. “Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster
sample survey”. The Lancet. Vol. 364, Issue 9448, p. 1857-1864; see also the debate
about the methodology in subsequent issues. BURNHAM, G. [et al.]. “Mortality after
the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey”. The Lancet. Vol.
368, Issue 9545, p. 1421-1428.
3 See FAY, M.T.; MORRISEY, M.; SMYTH, M. Northern Ireland’s Troubles: The
Human Costs. London: Pluto, 1999.
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Others have been less directly affected, whether by virtue of
their occupations, where they live or work, or by their age.8 These
others, in many ways, compose the mainstream of Northern
Ireland society, where political violence occupies a small, intermit-
tent and diminished space in consciousness. In post-Agreement
Northern Ireland, with diminishing levels of violence, where the
new Assembly is more or less functioning, and the economic down-
turn, increasing unemployment and other issues are rising in pro-
minence, issues relating to the past conflict are increasingly re-
garded as the preoccupations of a small number of die-hards and
aggrieved victims. In spite of some partial recognition of injustice
and their pain, as time passes, they are perhaps destined to become
ever more marginalized from the mainstream. Yet victims and how
they are treated continue to make the headlines.
In this changing environment, characterized as ‘post-con-
flict’, who are the recognized victims? Are some more deserving of
victim status than others? Why, and how, is the legitimacy of vic-
timhood contested? And is there a hierarchies of victims, and if so,
on what basis is that hierarchy constructed? 
WHO ARE THE VICTIMS? UNIVERSAL CLAIMS TO VICTIMHOOD
Northern Ireland is a highly segregated society where religion and
class combine to ensure the relative ignorance of sections of the
population about the material conditions of each other’s lives.
Therefore, perceptions of political violence and its impact are di-
verse and conflicting. In this context, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield,
appointed to act as first Victims Commissioner, produced his first
report in 1998, which found:
…some substance in the argument that no-one living in Northern
Ireland through this most unhappy period will have escaped some
degree of damage.9
Bloomfield’s approach implied that everyone was more or less in
the same boat. However, it is clear from the divergences of expe-
rience of political violence that there are substantial differences be-
tween men and women, between old and young, between
8 Those born before the beginning of the conflict have lived through the whole
period of conflict, whereas those born more recently have less cumulative experien-
ce of it.
9 BLOOMFIELD, K. Op. cit., para 2.13; p. 14.
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Catholics and Protestants and between regions, with some having
suffered more —in some cases much more— than others. There are
empirical, moral, political and practical grounds for resisting uni-
versal definitions of victimhood.
EMPIRICAL GROUNDS
The evidence shows clearly that individuals in Northern Ireland
have not all had equal exposure to political violence. Death rates of
residents of district council areas in Northern Ireland, and death
rates for those killed in those district council areas show that Belfast
(4.69 per thousand) has almost forty times the death rate of Ards
(0.12 per thousand) which explains why those who could afford to
do so moved out of Belfast into the more peaceful hinterland of
North Down and Ards. Even within Belfast, not all communities
have been equally affected, with deaths concentrated in particular
communities within North and West Belfast. So, the area in which
you have lived is a strongly determining factor of exposure to poli-
tical violence and of the risk of being killed, injured or bereaved. 
Occupation, status and ethno-political affiliation are also an
influential factors in determining rates of victimization. Civilians,
together with the security forces, account for the largest proportion
of the fatal victims. In terms of the two communities in Northern
Ireland, according to the Cost of the Troubles Study10 the death
rate for the entire period of the Troubles is 2.48 per thousand for
Catholics compared with 1.46 per thousand for Protestants using
the 1991 census figures, and calculations using all three censuses
varies the gap, but does not reverse this finding. Both in relative
and absolute terms, deaths of Catholics surpass those of
Protestants.
Universal definitions of victimhood, we are all victims, serve
to mask these differences, between men and women, young and
old, civilians and combatants, urban and rural and Catholics and
Protestants.
MORAL GROUNDS
Since the effects of political violence have been unequally distribu-
ted, one cannot morally sustain a claim that we are all victims
equally. Those of us who have witnessed the effects of political vio-
10 All statistical material is taken from FAY [et al.]. Op. cit.
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lence would balk at putting ourselves in the same category as those
whose who have suffered severely. To claim victim-hood based on
relatively minor exposure to violence and comparatively mild
effects detracts attention and resources from those who have suf-
fered most. Morally, attention and resources must be concentrated
on those who have suffered most.
POLITICAL GROUNDS
Contemporary Loyalism and Republicanism in Northern Ireland,
both explain their previous (and current, in the case of dissidents)
recourse to violence in terms of wrongs done to them and their
cause. Thus, both can be seen as ‘cultures of victim-hood’.
This claim to victimhood brings with it certain political
advantages. Thomas11 (1999) points to the manner in which cer-
tain victims are attributed the status of ‘moral beacons’, deriving
from what he calls the ‘Principle of Job’, the notion that ‘great suf-
fering carries in its wake deep moral knowledge’.12 Of course, victi-
mization by political violence does not necessarily lead to moral
improvement, but may rather lead to desires for retaliation and fee-
lings of hatred, for example. Placed in the context of militant poli-
tics, however, the desire for retaliation and the feelings of hatred
are more understandable, if not justifiable, when seen as the out-
come of victimization. Victims are perceived to be, first and fore-
most, deserving of sympathy and support; the victim, by definition
is vulnerable, and therefore others may be required to protect the
victim from further attack. Thus, victims can perform important
political functions: any attack conducted by or on behalf of the vic-
tim can be construed as self-defense and can therefore be justified
and thus may be (more) politically acceptable. Without access to
the justification of victim-hood, recourse to violence may become
morally indefensible and politically damaging. Resorting to vio-
lence in defense of victims is seen as morally courageous, politically
admirably and enhancing of status. Of course, this is distinct from
the actual responses of real victims. Examination of any cohort of
victims associated with any loss of life will reveal a wide variety of
victims’ responses. Some will want no retaliation, some will want
convictions and some revenge. When the incident becomes iconic
11 THOMAS, L.M. “Suffering as a Moral Beacon: Blacks and Jews”. In: FLANZ-




of that community’s grievance, or is politically appropriated —as
large incidents, such as Bloody Sunday or the Enniskillen bomb
often are— the suffering of victims may be deployed to do a politi-
cal job, to prove the depravity and immorality of those who carried
out the attack. Some victims may not wish to have their suffering
used in this way, nor might they subscribe to the demands for pro-
secutions, public inquiries or vengeance. However, these views are
often not represented where they are out of kilter with the political
purpose to which the victimization has become attached. They are
listened to or silenced13 according to their ‘fit’ with the political
project with which they, willingly or not, are associated.
Victims’ responses are not always their own, in that what
has befallen them aggrieves not only them, but their identity
group. Their experience of harm can become iconic of that group’s
grievance, in the way that Bloody Sunday became iconic for
Nationalists and Enniskillen or Bloody Friday served a similar pur-
pose for Unionists. Thus, victimization —and actual victims— have
a political value and are often used by politicians and ideologues to
further their particular political projects. These can include justi-
fying a recourse to violence.
PRACTICAL GROUNDS
Bloomfield’s first report to government in 1998 was cognizant of
the need for government ‘to aim its effort at a coherent and mana-
geable target group’ so as to target resources at those in greatest
need. Universal approaches mask the way in which damage and
loss has been concentrated in certain geographical areas, commu-
nities, occupational groups, age groups and genders. Bloomfield’s
final much narrower definition of a victim was the first official defi-
nition of a victim and shaped the definition ultimately used by
government:
The surviving physically and psychologically injured of violent conflict
—related incidents and those close relatives or partners who care for
them, along with the close relatives or partners who mourn their dead.14
13 SEREMATIKIS, C.N. The Senses Still: Perception and Memory As Material Culture
in Modernity. Chicago University Press; University of Chicago Press, 1996. Refers to
this kind of silencing as ‘hidden historical otherness’.
14 BLOOMFIELD, K. (1998).
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CONTESTS ABOUT VICTIM STATUS
In June 2007 the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced
the formation of a Consultative Group, co-chaired by Church of
Ireland Bishop Robin Eames and Denis Bradley a former Catholic
priest and the first Vice-Chairman of the Policing Board. The
Consultative Group on the Past (CGP) undertook consultations
and made recommendations on how Northern Ireland could best
deal with the past. In their January 2009 report they noted:
Throughout the consultation a number of areas of contention arose repea-
tedly —how victims are defined and, in particular, the use of definitions
which produce a hierarchy of victims that is broadly structured along
sectarian lines. Continuing this already highly politicised debate is both
fruitless and self-defeating.15
The CGP adopted the definition contained in the Victims and
Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, which defines a ‘victim
and survivor’ as: 
an individual appearing to the [Victims] Commissioner to be any of the
following: (a) someone who is or has been physically or psychologically
injured as a result of or in consequence of a conflict-related incident;
(b) someone who provides a substantial amount of care on a regular basis
for an individual mentioned in paragraph (a); or (c) someone who has been
bereaved as a result of or in consequence of a conflict-related incident.16
The Order also clarifies that witnessing a conflict-related incident
or providing medical or emergency assistance in a conflict-related
incident can result in psychological injury.17
However, contests about who can be considered a legitimate
victim persist. A number of voluntary groups, including FAIR
(Families Acting for Innocent Relatives) and HURT (Homes United
by Republican Terror, later changed to ‘Homes United by Recurring
Terror’) who were formed in the mid 1998 to represent ‘victims of
terrorism’, ‘innocent victims’, or ‘victims of Nationalist terror’
15 THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST. Report of The Consultative Group
on the Past. Belfast. Available at: <http://www.cgpni.org/fs/doc/Consultative%20
Group%20on%20the%20Past%20Full%20Report.pdf> [Access: May 16, 2009].
16 Statutory Instrument 2006 No. 2953 (N.I.17) The Victims and Survivors
(Northern Ireland) Order 2006. 3. -(1).
17 Statutory Instrument 2006.
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argued that those who were not ‘innocent’ (i.e. had associations
with Republican armed groups) were not ‘real’ victims.18 FAIR, for
example state:
There is a matter of high principle where we could never endorse a stra-
tegy, which will define terrorists as victims and thus legitimise their acti-
vities.19
Historically, the insistence that ‘terrorists’ and those associated
with them should not be included in any way in the category of
victim was an extension of the argument that ‘terrorists’ (and by
association, Sinn Féin) should not be included in government, and
that the Good Friday Agreement should be opposed. Many of these
groups originated in the border regions, where the deaths of mem-
bers of the predominantly Protestant local security forces had been
concentrated. They were particularly incensed by the early release
of prisoners as part of the Agreement and subsequent provision for
prisoners’ resettlement. This resentment led to the establishment of
a campaign for ‘Protestant civil rights’ under the umbrella organi-
zation, Northern Ireland Terrorist Victims Together (NITVT) in
which FAIR and HURT participated. NITVT, backed by anti-
Agreement politicians from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)
and Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), formulated a set of political
demands including the decommissioning and ballistic testing of
IRA weapons and the disbandment of terrorist groups.
Political activity by victims is perhaps best exemplified by
Michelle Williamson, whose parents were killed in the Shankill
Road bomb in 1993. She unsuccessfully sought a judicial review in
1999 of the Secretary of State’s ruling on the status of the IRA cea-
sefire with the support of the UUP, and David Trimble accompa-
nied her to court. In 2008, Williamson sought a second judicial
review of the decision to appoint Patricia McBride to a post as
Victims Commissioner, following McBride’s description of herself
as the sister of ‘an IRA volunteer killed on active service’.
Contests over the definition of victim largely emanate from
Loyalist sources in Northern Ireland, with the exception of an
attempt in the late 1990s to have prisoners included in the remit of
the government’s Victims Liaison Unit. However, the vocal strength
18 It is not clear whether they consider victims of Loyalist terror or victims of
state violence as ‘real’ victims. 
19 Available at: <http://victims.org.uk/s08zhk/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&task=blogsection&id=11&limit=9&limitstart=9> [Access: May 19, 2009].
HIERARCHIES OF PAIN AND RESPONSIBILITY: VICTIMS AND WAR BY OTHER MEANS IN NORTHERN IRELAND
35
of the unionist victim groups ensured that this did not take place.
Concessions to prisoners were seen as important confidence buil-
ding measures and a crucial part of the peace process. The Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam apologised to victims for
visiting the prisons to persuade prisoners to support the peace pro-
cess in January 1998, yet her actions enraged many. Indeed, the ini-
tiation of financial support for victims’ groups at that time was seen
as an attempt to assuage the anger of some victims.
The process of definition of victim-hood in Northern Ireland
has been one of political contest, where issues of inclusion and
exclusion are acted out in an ongoing contest. Legitimate victim
status should be granted to those with associations with non-state
armed groups, according to FAIR and others, although it may be
granted to members of the state security forces, and the fact that
the official definition does not make such exclusions is seen as
outrageous. According to this argument, one can not be both a per-
petrator and a victim, and these roles cannot be held simultane-
ously. The true diversity of those suffering harm is not admitted
into the category of ‘victim’.20
Contests over the definition of victimhood compose a con-
tinuing ‘war by other means’ in Northern Ireland.
HIERARCHIES OF VICTIMS
The CGP argued that particular definitions of victims give rise to a
hierarchy of victims structured along sectarian lines. Yet some have
argued that hierarchies of victims lend meaning to the past. Kevin
Rooney, a blogger, described how such a hierarchy operates in the
Republican community he grew up in:
... the deaths of young men who we believed were fighting against
British military occupation and repression were considered by us to be a
far greater loss than the deaths of the British soldiers and RUC men
enforcing British rule.21
20 See SMYTH, M. ‘Burying the Past? Victims and Community Relations in
Northern Ireland Since the Cease-fires.’ In: BIGGAR, N. (ed.). Burying the Past: Making
Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict. Washington DC: Georgetown University
Press. 2003 and BREEN SMYTH, M. Truth and justice after violent conflict: managing
violent pasts. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.
21 ROONEY, K. “The Troubles: a product of ‘virulent’ madness? The proposal
to give £12,000 ‘recognition pay’ to the families of all of those killed in Northern
Ireland is a subtle way of rewriting history”. Available at: <http://www.spiked-onli
ne.com/index.php?/site/reviewofbooks_article/6152/> [Access: May 18, 2009].
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In a society that continues to be divided, ‘our’ victims will rank hi-
gher than those considered to be the enemy, and until there is a
political reconciliation, this is likely to continue to be the case.
However, hierarchies among victims exist in quite another
way. The system of compensation or reparation that has operated
during the conflict, provided —and provides— higher levels of
compensation to members of the police and their families than to
members of the army and their families damaged by the conflict,22
and still lower levels of compensation to civilians. Furthermore,
some civilians are excluded altogether if they had a previous and
even unrelated criminal conviction, including motoring offences.
Within that system, some were awarded derisory amounts, since
the compensation was calculated on lost earnings, so the family of
a low wage earner, or unemployed person got little or nothing. The
compensation system was reviewed by Sir Kenneth Bloomfield and
a new tariff system was introduced, but this has applied only to
injuries or deaths that occurred after 1st May 2002, thus excluding
most of those affected by the conflict. The new scheme and com-
pensation available under the Terrorism Act 2000 still excludes or
reduces compensation for those with a criminal record.
The government’s provision for victims in the form of finan-
cial compensation, then, creates a hierarchy of victims. Some
might argue that it is right that such a hierarchy exists and would
fight for its retention. Others complain of the inherent inequities,
preferring a system where victims’ needs determine provision.
Indeed, there is a good argument for yet another type of hie-
rarchy of victims, based on operationalising a kind of triage system,
where victims with the greatest or most urgent needs are prioritised
over those with lesser needs. Where scarce resources are to be allo-
cated, hierarchies can serve to ensure that those resources go to
those in most need. The impulse to treat people equally and to
avoid creating hierarchies has been associated with political pro-
gress. Yet there are already hierarchies of pain and suffering, since
loss and hurt have not been evenly distributed.
Similarly, responsibility for violence is unevenly distributed.
Commonly, (ex)prisoners are identified as the group with the grea-
test responsibility, yet substantial numbers of those who have com-
mitted acts of violence were never convicted and never became pri-
soners, and some prisoners were victims of miscarriages of justice.
22 GRAVES, D. “Army widows want parity with RUC on pay-out”. Daily
Telegraph (June 19, 2001).
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On the question of responsibility for harm, the evidence suggests
that members of paramilitary organisations bear the heaviest res-
ponsibility, accounting for 80 per cent of the deaths with more
than half of all deaths the responsibility of Republican paramilita-
ries. Furthermore, paramilitaries killed members of their own com-
munities. Republican paramilitaries killed 24.7 percent of all
Catholics killed, and Loyalist paramilitaries killed 19.5 percent of
all Protestants killed. All the security forces (the police and army are
responsible for just over 10 percent of all deaths) killed more
Catholics than Protestants.
One can see elements of a hierarchical approach in the sta-
tements of apology issued by some of the armed groups. The
Combined Loyalist Military Command’s cease-fire statement in
1994 expressed ‘abject and true remorse’ to ‘the loved ones of all
innocent victims’ (my emphasis).23 The IRA apology issued in 2002,
used different language, perhaps reflecting the stage in the peace
process, and the pressure on Republicans to prove their commit-
ment to peace:
... we address all of the deaths and injuries of non-combatants caused by
us... We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to their families.
There have been fatalities amongst combatants on all sides. We also ack-
nowledge the grief and pain of their relatives. The future will not be
found in denying collective failures and mistakes or closing minds and
hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes all of the
victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be
achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed
more or less worthy than others.24
The direct use of violence may have been the role of relatively few
in the society, but the few cannot carry out their acts of violence
without wider support. Some of the harm done during the Troubles
was done in the name of causes that many of us support and in the
name of communities that we are a part of. For that reason alone,
a society-wide mechanism to deal with the violence of the past is
desirable.
23 The Independent Friday, 14 October 1994 The Loyalist Ceasefire: Combined
Loyalist Military Command statement Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk
/news/uk/the-loyalist-ceasefire-combined-loyalist-military-command-statement-
1442781.html> [Access: May 19, 2009].
24 BBC News Tuesday, 16 July, 2002, IRA statement in full Available at




The CGP made a series of recommendations, notably that an inde-
pendent Legacy Commission should be established to deal with the
past and combine processes of reconciliation, justice and informa-
tion recovery. Most controversially, they recommended that:
The nearest relative of someone who died as a result of the conflict in
and about Northern Ireland, from January 1966, should receive a one-off
ex-gratia recognition payment of £12,000.25
This led to a furore in the press and outrage was expressed by
Unionist victims at the launch of the report. They argued that it
was an insult to offer money, they were outraged by the unilateral
nature of the award and Michelle Williamson vowed not to take
‘one penny’ of what she described as ‘blood money’ because the
‘recognition payments’ put her parents on a par with the IRA mem-
ber killed planting the bomb that killed them.26
That recommendation was one amongst many, yet the other
recommendations went virtually undiscussed, so strong was the
reaction to this proposal. The CGP report as a whole will lead to a
set of proposals to be put before the Assembly. It remains to be seen
whether any agreement can be reached, given their difficulties in
reaching agreement on other matters.
POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND RECONCILIATION
These difficulties relate to the nature of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday
Agreement established two parallel political dynasties, allowing the
parties to the Northern Ireland conflict to ‘agree to disagree’. The
Agreement is consociational and according to Lijphart27 consociatio-
nalism offers the potential for (more or less) stable political solutions
where social and ethnic division otherwise prevent such solutions.
Belgium, Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands are cited as exam-
25 THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST. Op. cit.
26 ADAMS, S. “Northern Ireland compensation: Victims’ daughter ‘will not
take a penny’ Michelle Williamson’s mother Gillian and father George died in the




27 LIJPHART, A. “Consociational Democracy”. World Politics 21 (1969), p. 207-225.
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ples of successful consociational regimes. Lijphart28 argues that the
essential condition for successful consociationalism to succeed is the
existence of a strong elite within each ethnic silo willing to accom-
modate one another and marshal their followers to do likewise.29
Anderson and Goodman30 argue that the fatal flaw in the
consociational model is its assumption of the permanency of ethnic
division and Wilford,31 Taylor32 and Dixon,33 too, hold that conso-
ciationalism consolidates ethnic division. A consensus of criticisms
focuses on the propensity of the consociational model to institutio-
nalise ethnicity and its failure to foster cross-cutting identities.
CONCLUSION
Optimistically, the Agreement can be seen as merely the potential
beginning of the solution, not the solution itself. However, the critics
of consociationalism might argue that it offers little prospect of reso-
lution of difference in the long term. There is evidence of implacable
differences between the two main blocs over the old divisive issues
such as the transfer of policing and justice powers from Westminster,
the introduction of an Irish Language Act34 —and there is little evi-
dence of a meeting of minds over the issue of victims.
In terms of the application of the Northern Ireland case to
other conflicts, Horowitz35 argues that the Agreement was pro-
28 LIJPHART, A. “The Framework Document on Northern Ireland and the theo-
ry of power-sharing”. Government and Opposition 31/3 1996, p. 268.
29 LIJPHART (1996) was pessimistic about the prospects for a consociational
settlement because of the absence of support among Unionists, and because the
Unionist majority was married to the Westminster majoritarian tradition, and as-
´pired to the exercise of hegemonic power, rejecting power-sharing.
30 ANDERSON J.; GOODMAN, J. “Nationalisms and Transnationalism: Failures
and Emancipation”. In: ANDERSON J.; GOODMAN, J. Dis/Agreeing Ireland: Contexts,
Obstacles, Hopes. London: Pluto, 1998.
31 WILFORD, R. “Inverting Consociationalism? Policy Pluralism and the Post
Modern”. In: HADFIELD, B. (ed.). Northern Ireland: Politics and the Constitution.
Buckingham; Open University Press, 1992.
32 TAYLOR, R. “A Consociational Path to Peace in Northern Ireland and South
Africa”. In: GUELKE, A. (ed.). New Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Conflict.
Aldershot: Avebury, 1994.
33 DIXON, P. “The Politics of Antagonism: Explaining McGarry and O’Leary”.
Irish Political Studies 11(1996) p. 137-138.
34 PURDY, M. “Is Stormont heading for stalemate?” BBC News (Thursday, 10
July 2008). Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/northern_ire-
land_politics/7500762.stm> [Access: July 19, 2008].
35 HOROWITZ, D.L. “Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: The Sources
of an Unlikely Constitutional Consensus”. British Journal of Political Science (2002),
n. 32, p. 193-220. Cambridge University Press.
MARIE BREEN-SMYTH TRÍPODOS
40
duced under very specific conditions that are unlikely to be repli-
cated in other contexts. Furthermore, he argues that agreed institu-
tions do not necessarily ensure the delivery of functioning demo-
cracy in the long term.
A meeting of minds between the parties about victims, or
several other contentious matters is unlikely because the nature of
the settlement makes agreement optional, without some interven-
tion to address the grievances of the past. Even if such a mecha-
nism were put in place, and there is doubt about the commitment
of government to do so, it is unlikely to satisfy all the various cons-
tituencies of victims.
